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I. INTRODUCTION
As a Greek-American, I have developed a sense
of pride in the cultures which embody who I am as
a person. My family and I immigrated to the United
States in 1975. I was three years old at the time, and
the only language which I had heard up until then
was Greek. From that point onward, I would learn
to speak both English and Greek fluently. Although
the vast majority of my communication is now done
in English, I still do not feel comfortable speaking
English to Greek people, whether they understand
English or not. A prime example of this is my in-
ability to speak to my father in English, even though
he speaks the language fairly well, and uses it to
communicate in his business affairs on a daily basis.
Over the years, I have felt at liberty to speak
Greek to my family and other Greek speaking people
out in public. Always focusing on using the language
which I felt most at home with, I never realized
that I might have made some people uncomfort-
able by not using the English language. It was not
until the winter break of my second-year of law
school that I fully became aware of this phenom-
enon. About a week before Christmas, my step-
mother asked me to accompany her on a trip to a
department store to shop for my father. Having lived
in the United States for merely two years, she was
still in the early stages of developing her language
skills in English. Naturally, she and I walked about
the store looking at various items and conversing in
Greek. Continuing about with our conversation, we
walked passed a woman, who, upon hearing us,
whispered aloud "God damn it, doesn't anybody
' Translation: "What, they don't speak English in this
country?". It is worth noting that this was the most proxi-
mate translation to "Doesn't anybody speak English in this
country anymore?" that could be gotten in the Spanish
language.
2Candidate for Juris Doctorate, Washington and Lee
School of Law, May 1997. 1 wish to thank Professor Allan
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opment of this artide and Maria Feeley for her editorial
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speak English in this country anymore?" Hearing that
statement caused me to become visibly upset. I
walked up to the woman, informed her that I was a
law student and spoke English very well, and ac-
cused her of being racist. Up until that moment, I
had not realized that she actually said what many
people who have heard myself and others who speak
a language other than English think: Doesn't any-
body speak English in this country anymore?
Nowadays, it appears that this question is on
the minds of many people. Since the founding of
the lobbying group U.S. English in 1983, the En-
glish-Only movement has gathered momentum
across the nation. U.S. English is a national, non-
partisan, non-profit organization dedicated to en-
acting laws to make English the official language of
the United States government. 3 The organization has
640,000 members and is growing at the rate of 5,000
new members a month.4 Although the United States
has no official language, twenty one States have
passed measures establishing one.5 This paper ad-
dresses the question of whether a state statute or
constitutional provision which declares English the
official language of the state and requires English to
be used to perform all official acts violates the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause. Section II ex-
amines the constitutionality of English only laws
under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause.
Part A highlights the significant developments in the
official English movement. Part B proposes a theory
of the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause, and
considers whether or not official English laws stand
up under such a theory. Part C examines the consti-
tutionality of official English laws based on an analy-
3 See Constitutional Law- FirstAinendment- Ninth Cir.
cuit Invalidates Arizona Constitution's Official English Re-
quirenent, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1827 (1996) [hereinafter
Constitutional Law].
4 See Ninth Federal Court Ruling on Arizona's Official
English is Misguided Says US. English, U.S. Newswire, Oct.
5, 1995, 1995 WL 6620003.
' See Constitutional Law, supra note 3, at 1827.
sis of how the Supreme Court will decide Arizonans
for Official English v. Arizona later this term. Part D
considers the issue under the framework of the Equal
Protection Caluse of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section III offers a conclusion based on the respec-
tive analyses.
II. ENGLISH ONLY LAWS AND THE FREE
SPEECH CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT
A. The Debate Over Official English
1. Developments in the Official English
Movement
Over the last decade, language has received a
great deal of political attention in this country.6 The
language debate of the 1980's was similar to the lan-
guage battles of the early part of the century, where
appeals to patriotism and unity were made, and
minorities were casted in the role of outsiders who
deliberately chose not to learn the English language.
7
However, unlike the earlier period, where the issue
was confined to local and state arenas, the campaign
in the 1980's was orchestrated at the national level
by a powerful and highly funded lobby, U.S. En-
glish.8 The biggest spark that ignited this campaign
was the aggressive enforcement by civil rights au-
thorities of Lau v. Nichols.9
In Lau, officials responsible for the operation of
the San Francisco school system were being chal-
lenged by 1,800 students of Chinese ancestry who
were being denied supplemental courses in the En-
glish language as part of their public education.'0 At
issue in the case was whether school administrators
could meet their obligation under Title VI to pro-
vide "equal educational opportunities" merely by
treating all students the same, or whether they were
required to offer help to students unable to under-
stand English." The lower federal courts had ab-
solved the San Francisco school district of any re-
sponsibility for minority children's "language defi-
6 See, ag., Hiram Puig-Lugo, Freedom To Speak One
Language: Free Speech and the English Language Amend-
ment, 11 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 35 (1991).
7 See Jamie B. Draper & Martha Jiminez, A Chronol-
ogy of the Official English Movement, LANGUAGE LOYALTIES:
A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY
89 (James Crawford ed., 1992) [hereinafter LANGUAGE
LOYALTIES].
8 Id.
"414 U.S. 563 (1974).
ciency", thereby enabling the school district to con-
tinue on with their "sink or swim" approach.' 2 The
Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, disagreed.
Reasoning that the failure to take measures to ef-
fectively teach English skills (which lie at the core
of public school teaching) would end up making a
"mockery" of public education, the Court ordered
the school district to take affirmative steps to rec-
tify the students' language deficiency. '3
The decision establishing the right of limited-
English-proficient students to special help in over-
coming language barriers, and civil rights authori-
ties were not shy about demanding the so-called Lau
remedies. The stage was set for a decade of debate
over language, and the so-called threat to the iden-
tity of the nation. What transpired was a clash of
attitudes between anglo-conformity versus an ap-
preciation of diversity. The following events, which
transpired over the course of the decade, illustrate
how this debate was played out in the legislative
arena of the various states:
In 1980, Dade County, Florida voters approved
an "anti-bilingual ordinance" prohibiting the expen-
diture of public funds on the use of languages other
than English. Such things as fire safety information
pamphlets in Spanish, and transportation signs in
Spanish were prohibited.'
4
In 1981, Senator S.I. Hayakawa, himself an im-
migrant, introduced a constitutional English Lan-
guage Amendment (S.J. Res. 72), which was the first
proposal to declare English the nation's official lan-
guage.' 5 However, the bill died without Congres-
sional action. During the same year, the.Virginia leg-
islature declared English the state's official language
and made English the language of public instruc-
tion.16
In 1982, Senator Alan Simpson introduced the
first version of the Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act, which would have provided amnesty to
illegal immigrants who had resided in the United
States for a period of time and sanctions to employ-
ers who hired the under documented. 7 The bill
passed the Senate, but failed to pass the house.
'0Id. at 564.
" Id. at 566.
12Id.
'31d. at 568.




In 1983, U.S. English was founded by Senator
Hayakawa and Dr. John Tanton, the head of the Fed-
eration for American Immigration Reform. 8 At
about the same time, the California Committee for
Ballots in English sponsored Proposition 0 in San
Francisco, calling for an end to bilingual ballots. The
measure passed with 63 percent of the vote.
In 1984, New York State passed educational
reforms, including foreign language requirements for
all students, and the ability of nonnative English
speakers to receive credit for proficiency in their
native language19 Moreover, the Education for Eco-
nomic Security Act was passed by Congress, autho-
rizing federal funding for the improvement of for-
eign language instruction.20 Congress also extended
the Bilingual Education Act through 1988. In so
doing, it created new programs, such as develop-
mental bilingual programs which would enable stu-
dents to maintain their native tongues after learn-
ing English, academic excellence programs in bilin-
gual education, and family English literacy programs
involving parents of limited-English-proficient chil-
dren.21 However, the same year saw the approval of
proposition 38 by California voters, which called
for voting materials to be provided in English only.?
In 1986, California voters pass Proposition 63.
Included within is a provision allowing an individual
domiciled within the state to sue state or local gov-
ernments for actions which would diminish or ig-
nore "the role of English as the common language of
the State of California."23
In 1987, official English measures are passed in
Arkansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Da-
kota, and South Carolina.24 Further, a Cultural Rights
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is proposed
by Senator John Breaux and Representative Jimmy
Hayes. The amendment would recognize "the right
of the people to preserve, foster, and promote their
respective historic, linguistic, and cultural origins." 25









"bId. at 93. Further investigation also linked Tanton's
funding to a eugenics foundation and a distributor of na-
tivist propoganda. The most disturbing aspect about the
Official English movement is the ease with which it can
In 1988, an internal memorandum by Dr. John
Tanton, the chairman of U.S. English, surfaced in
the press. In the memo, Tanton warns of the un-
wanted traits which Hispanic immigrants could be
importing, such as "the tradition of the mordida
(bribe)", "low educability", "Catholicism", and "high
birthrates".26 Three states, Arizona, Colorado, and
Florida adopt Official English amendments to their
state constitutions.27 Afterward, a rise of incidents
of discrimination against minorities is reported in
each of these states.28
In 1990, the United States District Court strikes
down Arizona's Official English amendment as un-
constitutional. The requirement that state actors
perform their duties "in English and no other lan-
guage" is held to violate free speech under the First
Amendment. 29
2. Perspectives from Both Sides of the Issue
The aforementioned developments were
brought about in large part through the efforts of
influential lobbying groups on both sides of the de-
bate. On the one hand, groups such as U.S. English,
English First, and the American Ethnic Coalition
have, and will continue, to push for English only
laws based on their belief that the English language
keeps us in communication with one another and is
the fabric of our culture asAmericans. On the other
hand, groups such as the English Plus Information
Clearinghouse (EPIC), the National Association for
Bilingual Education, and the Mexican American
Legal Defense and Educational Fund focus their ef-
forts on preserving the right to speak in their native
tongue, and combating the English only movement,
which they believe is motivated by racism and other
anti-immigrant sentiments. These opposing view-
points are exemplified through the dialogue of two
influential figures in the debate, Senator S.I.
Hayakawa and Delegate Baltasar Corrada.
be used to cloak an underlying racist motivation, and sold
to the public, so to speak, under notions of patriotism
and national unity. The revelations mentioned above
prompted the resignation of Dr. Tanton as chairman of
U.S. English. This author wonders whether sentiments
such as these still live on in the organization of today.27 Id.
281d. Evidence such as this displays the real danger
for language to be used as a weapon of discrimination
against unpopular minorities.
' Id.
S.I. Hayakawa served as United States Senator
for California from 1977 to 1983.30 Senator
Hayakawa, after sponsoring the original version of
the English Language Amendment in 1981, helped
to establish U.S. English, the lobby aimed at pro-
moting the Amendment.31 A speech given by Sena-
tor Hayakawa, 32 makes the case for Official English.
Senator Hayakawa begins his speech by claiming that
a common language has enabled the populace to
become a society out of the "hodgepodge of nation-
alities, races, and colors represented in the immi-
grant hordes that people our nation."33 Hayakawa
believes that this led to the development of a new
kind of human being, the "American". In his speech,
he refers to a scene from Israel Zangwill's play The
Melting Pot. In that scene, the Russian Jewish immi-
grant character, after escaping to New York, exclaims:
Here you stand, good folk, think I, when I see
them at Ellis Island... in your fifty groups with
your fifty languages and histories, and your fifty
blood hatreds and rivalries, but you won't be
long like that, brothers, for these are the fires of
God you've'come to.. . A fig for your feuds and
vendettas! German and Frenchmen, Irishman
and Englishman, Jews and Russians- into the
Crucible with you all! God is making the
American.34
Hayakawa believes that the resistance to this
"melting pot" ideal threatens the very fabric that
makes us "Americans". He focuses on the resistance
to this by the Hispanic speaking people, who claim
that the national ideal should be "a 'salad bowl', in
which different elements are thrown together but
not 'melted', so that the original ingredients retain
their distinctive character."35 In contrast to such
groups as Anglo-, Italian, Polish-, Greek-,Lebanese-,
Chinese-, and Afro-Americans who rejoice in their
30 See Senator S.I. Hayakawa, The Case for Official
English, in LANGUAGE LOYALmES at 94.
311d.
32 Reprinted as One Nation... Indivisible? The English
Language Amendment (Washington, D.C.: Washington




36 1d. at 98.
37 Id.
3I Id. at 100. Although Senator Hayakawa perceives
a potential threat from linguistic division, his speech fails
to account for the effects on the threat that has existed in
this country for decades: racial division. Senator Hayakawa,
ethnic diversity but still use the English language to
communicate, Hayakawa feels that the overly am-
bitious Hispanic Caucus looks forward to the day
when Spanish will be accepted as a form of com-
munication separate from that of English.36 He cites
the following evidence in support of his belief: the
Hispanic culture's lack of dissent about the fact that
bilingual education programs often result in no En-
glish being taught at all, the leadership's lack of alarm
over the fact that large portions of the Cuban,
Puerto-Rican and Mexican American populations do
not speak English and have no intentions of learn-
ing, and the public's rejoice when concessions are
made, such as the Spanish-language Yellow Pages
which were made available in Los Angeles.37
Based on his agreement with PresidentTheodore
Roosevelt's statement that "we have room for but
one language here [English]... for we intend to see
that the crucible turns our people out as Americans,
of American nationality, and not as dwellers in a
polyglot boarding house", Hayakawa concludes that
the aggressive movement on the part of Hispanics
to "reject assimilation and to seek to maintain- and
give official status to- a foreign language" will im-
pair our ability to unite as a nation, and possibly
lead to the type of linguistic division that has torn
apart nations like Canada, Belgium, and Sri Lanka.38
Baltasar Corrada served as the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico's nonvoting delegate in the U.S.
House of Representatives from 1977 to 1985.39 On
June 12, 1984, Mr. Corrada testified before the U.S.
Senate, Subcommittee on the Constitution in op-
position to Official English. 40 In his testimony,
Corrada sets forth his position that the people of
the United States believe in freedom, and that En-
glish is the language of the United States by virtue
of the people's choice, and not by governmental
imposition.
41
in making his case for Official English, may unwittingly
be making the case against racial harmony.
39See Delegate Baltasar Corrada, Viva la Roja, Blanca
y Azul, LANGUAGE LOYALTiES at 118.
40 d.
41 Id. In the modem era, economic reality, in and of
itself, yields support for the position that individuals will
learn English on their own volition. In our nation, ones
competitiveness in the job market depends more and more
upon an ability to communicate in English given the fact
that we have become an intensely information oriented
society. Moreover, in the international business arena, there
is no question about the prominent role that English plays
and the resulting opportunities which are available to one
who speaks the language.
Contrary to Hayakawa's premise, Corrada does
not believe that establishing English as the official
language would yield a "positive impact on our so-
cial, economic, and political life."42 Corrada testifies
that America's greatness is based on the fact that its
people are united by fundamental principles such
as freedom, justice, equal opportunity for all, fair-
ness and democracy, and equates the argument that
the country would be made stronger by making it
"U.S. English" to that of making it "U.S. white".
43
Corrada also made it clear before the Subcommit-
tee his belief that a governmental imposition of the
English language on an individual would be "a fron-
tal attack on the right to freedom of speech pro-
vided in the First Amendment to the Constitution."
44
With the aforementioned developments and
viewpoints in mind, we turn to a consideration of
the issue within the context of freedom of expres-
sion under the First Amendment.
B. The Underlying Theory of Freedom of Expression
The First Amendment to the United States
Constitution reads: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances."4 (emphasis added).
The language regarding the freedom of expression
is open ended in and of itself This has led to much
discussion among legal scholars as to the rationale
behind the First Amendment's speech and press
clauses. In this part of the article, we examixe some
of these writings in order to uncover a plausible ra-
tionale behind the respective clauses, and to apply
this rationale to the issue at hand. We consider es-
says byVincent Blasi andThomas I. Emerson in turn.
In The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory46 Vincent Blasi analyzes the history of the
Speech and Press clauses in an attempt to ascertain
their primary purpose. Blasi focuses on the fact that
political thought has always been aimed at the ten-
dency of public officials to abuse their power, in
coming up with what he believes to be the primary
421Id. at 119.
41Id. at 121.
44 1d. at 120.
45 U.S. CoNsT. amend. 1.
46 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amend-
ment Theory, 1977 A.B.F. REs. J. 521.
47Id.
48sd. at 528.
purpose: checking government as a means of guard-
ing against abuse.47 He begins his analysis by noting
some of the writings from the English essayists of
the eighteenth-century. Blasi believes that the most
important influence came from the writings of
"Cato", which was the pen name of co-authors John
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, and John Wilkes.
48
Cato's letter entitled "Of Freedom of Speech"
emphasizes the people's need for recourse against
government officials gone astray. Cato writes:'"Who-
ever would overthrow the Liberty of a Nation must
begin by subduing the Freeness of Speech; a Thing
terrible to public Traytors." 9 Wilkes also espoused
this point in the first published issue of the North
Briton, where he wrote:
The liberty of the press is the birth-right of a
Briton, and is justly esteemed the firmest bul-
wark of the liberties of this country. It has been
the terror of all bad ministers; for their dark and
dangerous designs, or their weakness, inability,
and duplicity, have thus been detected and
shewn to the public, generally in too strong and
just colours for them long to bear up against
the odium of mankind."0
Blasi argues that the First Amendment was an out-
growth of this body of thought, and cites the eigh-
teenth-century American writings on freedom of
speech and freedom of the press as evidence.5" Based
on this evidence, he concludes that the primary
purpose of the Speech and Press Clauses of the First
Amendment is to "check the inherent tendency of
government officials to abuse the power entrusted
to them."
5 2
Assuming that Blasi is correct in interpreting
the First Amendment as a means of enabling the
governed to check abuses by those who govern them,
the question remains as to how a state statute or
constitutional provision adopting English as the of-
ficial language would hold up under such theory.
For purposes of discussion, let us assume that state
X has adopted such a statute. Let us also assume
that a large percentage of the population of state X
is made up of Hispanic speaking people who have
49 Md. at.530.
01d. at 533.
51 Id. at 534-536. Blasi focuses on the writings of such
influential figures in the framing of the Constitution as
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander
Hamilton.
SZd. at 538.
yet to develop their skills in English to the point
where they can communicate effectively in that lan-
guage.
The statute which is in effect prohibits any "state
actor" from conducting official business in a language
other than English. As a result, agencies in state X,
such as the department of motor vehicles, environ-
mental protection agency, department of revenue,
zoning administration, department of corrections,
etc..., would be proscribed from engaging in activi-
ties such as publishing and distributing information
regarding its procedures, activities and/or regulations
in a language other than English, and publishing
forms and/or other documentation used for official
business in a language other than English.
Given the inherent make-up of state X's popu-
lation, the query arises as to the ability of a signifi-
cant portion of its population to check against gov-
ernmental abuse under such circumstances. The in-
ability to receive information regarding areas of gov-
ernment that affect the rights, duties and liberties
of these individuals as citizens militates against their
ability to effectively participate in the democratic
process. The fact of the matter remains that we, as a
nation, are made up of many states with population
structures similar to state X's. Although most of
these population groups do, over time, develop their
skills in English53, a state statute or constitutional
amendment limiting their ability to receive infor-
mation during the time span when they cannot com-
municate in English would strip them of the ability
to check against abuses in government. Accordingly,
under Blasi's theory of the First Amendment, such
laws would dearly be in violation of the FirstAmend-
ment to the Constitution.
In Toward a General Theory of the First Amend-
ment,54 Thomas I. Emerson outlines what he believes
is the theory of freedom of expression in its modem
form. Emerson suggests that society deems a sys-
tem of free expression necessary for four main rea-
sons: (1) assuring individual self-fulfillment, (2) as
a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method of
securing participation by the members of the soci-
ety in social, including political, decision-making,
and (4) as maintaining the balance between stabil-
A natural incentive to learn English stems from the
difficulty inherent in surviving economically without such
proficiency.
s Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.1 877 (1963) [hereinafter
Emerson].
55Id. at 878-879.
ity and change in the society."5 Emerson takes up
each of the four reasons in turn.
Emerson begins by stating his belief that the
primary justification for freedom of expression is
"the right of an individual purely in his capacity as
an individual." 6 He bases this on the fumdamental
premise of Western thought, which emanates from
a human being's desire to realize his or her charac-
ter and potentialities. Emerson writes:
Man is distinguished from other animals prin-
cipally by the qualities of his mind. He has pow-
ers to reason and to feel in ways that are unique
in degree if not in kind. He has the capacity to
think in abstract terms, to use language, to com-
municate his thoughts and emotions, to build a
culture. He has powers of imagination, insight
and feeling. It is through development of these
powers that man finds his meaning and his place
in the world3 7
As a result, any form of restraint over expression is
deemed to be consistent with Milton's statement
that "[it is] the greatest displeasure and indignity to
a free and knowing spirit that can be put upon him"58
The second justification for freedom of expres-
sion is what Emerson calls the "attainment of truth".5 9
This theory is based on a widespread application of
Socratic dialogue. For instance, Emerson states that
"the soundest and most rational judgment is arrived
at by considering all facts and arguments which can
be put forth in behalf of or against any proposition."6
Conversely, he feels that suppression of information
prevents the formation of rational judgment and
tends to perpetuate error.61
The third function of freedom of expression
strikes at the core-purpose of a democratic society.
Emerson labels this the "participation in decision
making" function.62 He believes that this function is
crucial, given that we adhere to a governmental pro-
cess which is wholly dependent upon the flow of
information. Emerson refers to the premise of the
Declaration of Independence in support of this. He
argues that because our government derives "[its]
just powers from the consent of the governed", the








governed must have full freedom of expression in
forming both individual judgments and the com-
mon judgment.63
Lastly, Emerson cites the "balance between sta-
bility and change" as a function of freedom of ex-
pression.r4 This function is based on the idea that
suppression of information leads to an unstable so-
ciety by virtue of concealing the real problems which
confront it and leaving the suppressed apathetic or
desperate.65 The proper balance is achieved, accord-
ing to Emerson, when dissidents are allowed to "let
off steam" through the process of open discussion.
66
The task at hand is to hold up our hypothetical
"English only" provision to Emerson's theory of free-
dom of expression under the First Amendment in
an effort to ascertain its constitutionality. We take
up the analysis according to each of the four respec-
tive functions in turn. First off, the question becomes
how, if at all, does an "English only" provision play
on "an individual's realization of his character and
potentialities as a human being?"
67
The answer to the question posed seems quite
dear. Up until the point where a member of the
Hispanic population in state X develops his or her
English skills well enough to communicate effec-
tively, his or her "thoughts, emotions, insight, and
feelings" 68 are constricted by virtue of the "English
only" provision. The individual's self-fulfillment can
only be maximized up to the point of his or her
understanding in the native tongue. For instance, a
member of this population would not have the abil-
ity to develop an insight as to such things as the
history of the United States due to the fact that the
provision would proscribe funding for the teaching
of this subject in Spanish. Only after the individual
attended English class could he or she begin to de-
velop his or her thoughts and feelings regarding this
and other topics. Similarly, it is not far-fetched to
assume that such person's development of "his or
her potentialities as a human being"69 would be re-
strained by virtue of the inability to obtain a driver's
license because the provision would prohibit the
administration of a driving test in a language other
than English. Although one may point out that al-
ternative modes of transportation would be avail-
able to such person up until the time when he or
she could pass the test in English, anyone who has
ever taken the bus can surely understand how diffi-
cult it would be to conduct the activities that are a
63Id. at 883.
,4 Id. at 884.
6 5 Id.
6'Id. at 885.
part of our daily lives under such constraints. Simple
things, such as the ability to gather at the home of a
friend for a holiday celebration, attending lectures,
festivals and other cultural events, and the capacity
to take ones family out of town for a vacation, would
become virtually infeasible for a significant number
of state X's population for an indefinite amount of
time.
In terms of the thoughts, feelings and emotions
of an individual subject to such a provision, the over-
whelming effect could very well be indistinguish-
able from a law mandating, for instance, that people
of a certain race or ethnic background ride in the
back of the bus. The likelihood is strong that an "En-
glish only" provision such as the one we have postu-
lated would have a debilitating effect on the very
thing that we pride ourselves on as a Western cul-
ture: the right of an individual to pursue his or her
self-fulfillment. As a result, such a provision is con-
trary to one of the primary functions of freedom of
expression under the First Amendment.
The analysis of the next two functions identi-
fied by Emerson, the "attainment of truth" and the
"participation in the decision making process", can
be performed concurrently. The benefits of the abil-
ity to engage in "Socratic dialogue" and the "effec-
tive participation in a democratic process" are both
dependent on one thing: the free flow of informa-
tion. What an "English only" provision does is stream-
line the flow of information to a select group of the
population. Citizens who are capable of speaking
English would have access to information regarding
the daily activities, rules, and regulations under
which they are governed, and would indeed have
the ability to communicate their thoughts and im-
pressions regarding such matters. However, citizens
without this capability would effectively be shunned
from the very core of the democratic process up until
the time when they learned the English language.
In effect, such people are held to "good citizenship"
without the state providing for their understanding
of what it is that that means. A state with an "En-
glish only" provision effectively requires its non-
English speaking citizens to run before they have
learned how to walk. The "training wheels", so to
speak, are never provided in such states. Voting reg-
istration documents are drafted only in English.Tax
forms are published only in English. Agencies pub-
lish their rules and regulations only in English.
67 d. at 879.
6 Id.
6 9 1d.
Based on an unrealistic fear that non-English
speaking people will refuse to develop their skills in
English if assistance is provided to them in their
native tongue, states with English only provisions
would be, willingly, ebbing the flow of information
to a significant amount of their citizens. As we have
seen, the free flow of information lies at the core of
the democratic process. Given the curtailing effect
that an English only provision would have on this
flow, such provisions must be deemed to violate free-
dom of expression under the First Amendment.
Lastly, an examination of Emerson's fourth func-
tion of freedom of expression brings us to a similar
conclusion. Emerson identified this last function as
the "balance between stability and change." Of note
in this discussion is Emerson's statement that sup-
pression of expression "drives opposition under-
ground, leaving those suppressed either apathetic
or desperate. It thus saps the vitality of the society
or makes resort to force more likely."70 States which
adopt "English only" provisions will surely breed dus-
ters of apathetic and/or desperate people given the
isolating effect of such a provision. Passed accord-
ing to such idealistically "patriotic" beliefs as those
expressed by Senator Hayakawa,7' the real effect of
English only laws will be to drain the moral of those
who do not fit the ideal immigrant mold. For in-
stance, an immigrant who is not up to speed on his
English skills could be disenchanted from master-
ing the English language by virtue of the existence
of such a law. Feeling persecuted against, this per-
son may choose to continue on with the exclusive
use of his or her language, and could possibly limit
his or her activities to those where he would be able
to continue to do so. This very well may lead to clus-
ters of ethnic populations where the citizens would
deliberately choose to use English as little as pos-
sible.
Contrary to Hayakawa's dream of a populace
bonded together through a uniform language, the
practical effect could be that by disabling the immi-
7 Id. at 884.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 30-42.
72See Emerson, supra note 54, at 885.
73See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d
920,928 (9th Cir. 1994) (Besides Arizona, states that have'
adopted English only provisions are: Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina,
North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia).
"See, ag., CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6 (provision estab-
lishes English as the official language without imposing
any prohibition on other languages or affecting their use
in the functioning of state government); See also, Puerto
grants' ability to "let off steam" 72 through the use of
a language other than English on occasion, he will
choose to completely turn his back on the English
language and the government imposing such con-
straints upon him. In this sense, suppressing such
freedom of expression throws off what could other-
wise be a stable populace. Instead of allowing for
such group's natural progression in mastering the
English language, and providing a helping hand along
the way, a state adopting an English only provision
invidiously discriminates against a group of its citi-
zens. Contrary to U.S. English and Senator
Hayakawa's prediction, such laws will actually in-
crease the likelihood that the populace of this coun-
try will not share a common language bond.
C. Kelly's Case: The Future of English-Only Pro-
visions After Arizonans for Official English
v. Arizona
1. Background
Presently, twenty one states have decided to
adopt English as their official languages. 3 Of par-
ticular importance to the present discussion is Ar-
ticle XXVIII of the Arizona Constitution. Unlike
the majority of states, whose English only provisions
are primarily symbolic,74 the amendment to the Ari-
zona Constitution carries the potential to signifi-
cantly impede upon individuals' freedom of speech
rights.75 In 1987, Arizonans for Official English ini-
tiated a petition drive to amend the Arizona consti-
tution to include a provision prohibiting the
government's use of a language other than English.7
6
The measure passed with a mere fifty and five-tenths
percent (50.5%) of the vote. Article XXVIII, "En-
glish As The Official Language" opens with an an-
nouncement that English is the official language of
the State of Arizona. As the official language of the
state, it is deemed to be the language of the ballot,
public schools, and all government functions and
Rican Org. for PoliticalAction v. Kusper, 490 E2d 575, 577
(7th Cir. 1973) (noting that official-English law appears
with laws naming state bird and state song, and does not
restrict use of non-English languages by state and city agen-
cies).
75 See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 928 (federal district court
determined that Arizona provision prohibited the use of
any language other than English by all officers and em-
ployees of all political subdivisions while performing their
official duties).76Id. at 924.
77 See Akiz. CONST. art. XXVIII.
actions. The article specifies which entities will be
affected by its terms. Among these are the legisla-
tive, executive and judicial branches of the state,
political subdivisions, departments, agencies, orga-
nizations and instrumentalities in their entirety, and
officials and employees of the state while in perfor-
mance of government business. Under section 2 of
the Article, the State is given the sweeping power
to take all reasonable steps to "preserve, protect, and
enhance" the role of English as the official language
of the state. TheArticle does, however, go on to pro-
vide exceptions for some limited situations. Section
3 permits the State to act in a language other than
English in order to: (1) assist students who are not
proficient in English, (2) to comply with other fed-
eral laws, (3) to teach students a foreign language as
part of an educational curriculum, (4) to protect
public health and safety, and (5) to protect the rights
of criminal defendants or victims of crime. Even with
these exceptions, the core language strikes at a wide
array of governmental activities and the persons who
conduct them.
2. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English
Maria-Kelley Yniguez (Kelly) was one of the
individuals who was immediately affected by the
passage of Article XXVIII. When the article was
passed, Kelly was employed by the Arizona Depart-
ment of Administration.78 She was charged with
handling medical malpractice claims asserted by ei-
ther the State of Arizona or physicians for whom
the state provided insurance.79 Prior to the passage
of the article, Kelly, a Hispanic fluent and literate in
both English and Spanish, communicated in Span-
ish with monolingual Spanish-speaking claimants,
and in a combibation of English and Spanish with
bilingual claimants. 0 She would frequently conduct
interviews in Spanish for monolingual Spanish-
speakers in addition to documenting and communi-
cating administrative decisions regarding claims in
Spanish.8' Furthermore, Kelly would often speak
Spanish to persons who spoke both English and
8See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 924.
'9 Brief for Respondent at 7 (1996 WL 426410).
0 Id.
8, Id.; see also, Id. at 34 (The State of Arizona has
stipulated that its operations are enhanced by permitting
service employees to communicate with citizens of the
State in languages other than English where the citizens
are not proficient in English).
82Id. at 7.
13 Id. at8.
Spanish in order to facilitate expression of ideas and
feelings which could not otherwise be expressed
through the use of English.82 Kelly discontinued
these practices immedialtely when she became aware
of the content of Article XXVIII. As an employee
of the state, she was sworn to obey the Constitution
and the laws of Arizona. Moreover, Kelly was con-
vinced that she would be subject to sanctions, in-
cluding the possibility of termination, if she contin-
ued to use Spanish on the job. 4 Based on this fear,
Kelly restricted her on-the-job vocabulary to English
and filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42
U.S.C. § 2000(d). s Later, Kelly amended her com-
plaint to add State Senator Jaime Gutierrez, a bilin-
gual State Senator representing a district of non-
English citizens with whom he often communicated
in Spanish regarding governmental matters of inter-
est to them.8 6 The complaint, as amended, sought
an injunction against state enforcement of Article
XXVIII and a declaration that the article violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Con-
stitution.8 7 It named the State of Arizona, Gover-
nor Rose Mofford, and Arizona Attorney General
Robert Corbin, amongst others, as the defendants."8
The Federal District Court for the district of Ari-
zona granted motions to dismiss for the State and
Robert Corbin.89 However, the court found that
Kelly could maintain an action against Governor
Mofford given that she possessed the authority to
enforce the article, and had expressed a willingness
to do so.90 Upon reaching the merits of the case, the
district court read Article XXVIII broadly, finding
that it effectively bars all state officers and employ-
ees from using any language other than English in
performing their official duties.9' Thus construed,
the court found that the article infringed on consti-
tutionally protected speech and was facially over-
broad in violation of the First Amendment. 2 Gov-
ernor Mofford, as the only remaining defendant and
an outspoken critic of the article, decided not to
appeal the judgment.93 Arizonans for Official En-
glish (A.O.E.), the lobby group principally respon-




87 See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 925.





93 Id. at 8.
sage of the article, responded to Governor Mofford's
decision not to appeal with a motion to intervene
post-judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a).94 The district court denied their
motion to intervene.95
On July 19, 1991, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of
A.O.R.'s intervention motion. The court based its
decision on the idea that A.O.R.'s relationship to
Article XXVIII was analogous to that of a state leg-
islature to a state statute in that they had a "strong
interest in the vitality of a provision of the state con-
stitution which [it had] proposed and for which [it
had] vigorously campaigned."96 A.O.E. filed its No-
tice of Appeal 15 months later.97
On December 7, 1994, a three-judge panel of
the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion on the merits.98 The 9th Circuit decided to re-
hear the case en banc, and in a six-to-five decision,
affirmed the holding of the three judge panel. Of
the various opinions in the case, Judge Reinhardt's
majority and special concurring opinion, and Judge
Kozinski's dissenting opinion are worthy of men-
tion. Judge Reinhardt begins the decision by ana-
lyzing the district court's broad construction of Ar-
ticle XXVIII.Viewing the article as"by far the most
restrictively worded official-English law to date,"
Judge Reinhardt goes on to adopt the district court's
interpretation: that the article is not limited in its
application to mere "official acts" of governmental
entities, but applies to all government officials and
employees during the performance of their duties.9
Upon reaching the merits, Judge Reinhardt con-
ducted an overbreadth analysis. Under the
overbreadth doctrine, an individual whose own
speech may constitutionally be prohibited is permit-
ted to challenge the facial validity of a provision
because of the threat that the speech of third par-
ties not before the court will be chilled. 00 Based on
the fact that the article applied to all individuals in
government service and focused explicitly on lan-
9 Id.
95 See Yniguez v. Mofford, 130 F.R.D. 410 (D.Ariz.
1990).
96See Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 733 (9th Cir.
1991).
97 See Brief for Respondent at 10.
98 See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d
1217 (9th Cir. 1994).
"' See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 929.
"Old. at 931 (citing Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews
for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987)).
', See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 931-934.
guages other than English, Judge Reinhardt con-
cluded that the article would be facially invalid if it
infringed upon First Amendment rights.'0 '
A.O.E. set forth two arguments regarding Ar-
tide XXVIII's impact on the FirstAmendment. First,
A.O.E. claimed that the court should apply the same
level of First Amendment scrutiny as that in "sym-
bolic speech" cases. 02 Judge Reinhardt dismissed the
claim that Article XXVIII regulated only conduct,
reasoning that "language is by definition speech, and
the regulation of any language is the regulation of
speech." 03 Second, A.O.E. claimed that what Kelly
was actually seeking to establish was an affirmative
right to have government operations conducted in a
foreign tongue.' Judge Reinhardt quickly dismissed
this argument, finding that Kelly's claim was for the
protection of speech by a public employee. 05
In ultimately deciding upon the article's impact
on FirstAmendment rights, Judge Reinhardt invoked
the authority of Waters v. Churchill0 6 and Pickering
v. Board of Educ.10 7 Waters-Pickering established a
distinction between "public concern" and "private
interest" speech.10B The government, even with its
inherent authority to control the speech of its em-
ployees to a greater extent than that of citizens, is
still subject to the greater constitutional protection
given to the employees when they speak on matters
of public concem.1 9 Even though Kelly's speech did
not fit easily into the categories, Judge Reinhardt
found that her speech was of the kind that was "un-
questionably of public import"." 0 Judge Reinhardt
identified some of the harmful effects that would
occur if such speech were proscribed. He stated that,
for example:
monolingual Spanish-speaking residents of Ari-
zona cannot, consistent with the article, com-
municate effectively with employees of a state
or local housing office about a landlord's wrong-
ful retention of a rental deposit, nor can they
learn from clerks of the state court about how
102 1 d. at 934; see also, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989), United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
'
0 3 See Yniguez, 69 F3d at 935.
,04 Id. at 936.05Id. at 938.
106511 US;-661 (1994).
107391 U.S. 563 (1968).
'01See Waters, 511 U.S. at 661; Pickering, 391 U.S. at
563, 573-574.
109See Waters, 511 U.S. at 670.
""See Yniguez, 69 E3d at 941.
and where to file small claims court complaints.
They cannot obtain information regarding a
variety of state and local social services, or ad-
equately inform the service-givers that the gov-
ernmental employees involved are not perform-
ing their duties properly or that the government
itself is not operating effectively or honestly."'
Given such an impediment to First Amendment
rights, Judge Reinhardt ruled that the article was
unconstitutionally overbroad.) 
2
In dissent, Judge Kozinski premised his com-
ments on the idea that the ruling in the case created
the risky notion that "government employees have
a personal stake in the words they utter when they
speak for the government.""3 Judge Kozinski points
out that "government has no mouth, it has no hands
or feet; it speaks and acts through people. Govern-
ment employees must do what the state can't do
for itself because it lacks corporeal existence; in a
real sense, they are the state."'1 4 Judge Kozinski stated
his belief that the case was governed by the prin-
ciples set forth in Rust v. Sullivan." s Consistent with
Rust, Kozinski felt that because the employee was
speaking in her official capacity, the government
could rightfully determine what she would or would
not be permitted to say)
6
The approach taken by Judge Kozinski sparked
Judge Reinhardt to write a special concurring opin-
ion in order to attack it. In that opinion, Judge
Reinhardt argued that Judge Kozinski's approach
would foster an "Orwellian world where Big Brother
could compel its minions to say War is Peace and
Peace is War, and public employees would be help-
less to object."" 7 He also went on to note what he
believed to be one of the main protections of the
First Amendment; the public's interest in receiving
"information of vital importance from the govem-
ment."1
8
A recent article by Scott'H. Angstreich pub-
lished in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy
suggests that this latter point was the real issue in
Yniguez. Angstreich claims that if any of Kelly's free
speech rights were implicated, it was by virtue of
the audience that she was speaking to and their in-
" Id. at 947.
"
2 1d. at 962.
"Id. at 960.
"
4 Id. at 962.
"500 U.S. 173 (1991).




terest in the content of her communication. 1 He
believes that Judge Reinhardt erred in trying to
squeeze the situation into the Waters-Pickering analy-
sis, based on what he sees as a clear understanding
that her speech was neither a matter of public con-
cem (which normally refers to speaking as a citizen
about government policy) nor merely a matter of
private interest. 20 Angstreich concludes that this
approach, coupled with the application of the "un-
constitutional conditions doctrine" which acts to
prevent the government from asking an individual
to surrender by agreement rights that the govern-
ment could not take by direct action, must be taken
in gauging the constitutionality, or lack thereof, of
the English only movement.1
2'
The approach takenzz in resolving the issue
should become evident later in the term. The Su-
preme Court has granted A.O.E.'s petition for cer-
tiorari, and oral arguments are set for December 4,
1996.'2 The remainder of the article will discuss
the arguments presented by both sides, and predict
the outcome of the case based upon the briefs pre-
sented by both sides and an analysis of the ques-
tions asked by the respective justices upon oral ar-
guments.
3. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona
a. Legal arguments before the Court
On March 26, 1996, the United States Supreme
Court grantedA.O.E.'s petition for certiorari.1'4 The
questions before the Supreme Court are as follows:
1) whether a State constitutional provision declar-
ing English the official language of the State and
requiring English to be used to perform official acts
violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
ment, 2) whether a government employee has a Free
Speech right to disregard the official language of her
employer and choose the language in which to per-
form official actions, 3) whether petitioners (A.O.E.)
have standing to maintain the action, and 4) whether
a case or controversy exists with respect to
respondentYniguez? The parties were requested to
brief and argue the third and fourth questions by
"
9 See Scott H.Angstreich, Speaking in Tongues: Whose
Rights at Stake, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 634, 639
(1995).201d. at 639.
21 d. at 642.
122 Assuming a decision is rendered on the merits.
123 See 64 U.S.L.W 3635 (No. 95-974).
124 Id.
order of the Court, dated March 25, 1996.125 For
purposes of the discussion in this part of the article,
we assume that the Court will answer the proce-
dural questions in the affirmative, and thus reach
the merits of the case. We focus the analysis instead
on the arguments brought forth by each side regard-
ing the substantive questions presented.
The analysis of the parties' arguments with re-
spect to the first two questions presented can be
grouped together. Petitioners (A.O.E.) base their
argument regarding these issues on a two pronged
attack. Specifically, they claim that a) the judiciary
has traditionally reserved choices about the use of
language for the political branches, and b) that the
Court should apply the standard of review from
Kelley v. Johnson, 26 Waters v. Churchill,2 7 and
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.'
28
because, as in those cases, the government is the party
speaking. Under such a standard, the government's
choice would only be overturned if it were so irra-
tional that it would be branded 'arbitrary'.
With respect to the first prong of their argu-
ment, petitioners cite Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Temp
Elementary School Dist. No. 3129 and Carmona v.
Sheffield 30 as evidence of the judiciaries' willingness
to leave choices about language to the political
branches.' 3' They claim that one reason for the
courts' deference is the sheer number of languages
which confront poicymakers132 A.O.E. posed the
question of whether Arizona could "respond to ser-
vice requests in Spanish and not in several of the
native American languages that so enrich the
State?" 33 They assert that such things as requiring
the state to produce documents in numerous lan-
guages or provide translations would create an enor-
mous burden.134 The effectiveness of this argument,
however, is dependent upon the Court's response
to the second prong of their argument; specifically,
is it the government or the individual who is doing
the talking? If the Court believes that it is the latter,
it may very well be the case that the effects of the
article are viewed as prior restraints on speech con-
tent. If that were the case, the state would have a
1 Id. at 3639.
126425 U.S. 238 (1976).
127511 U.S. 661 (1994).
12 115 S.Ct. 2510 (1995).
12 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978).
.30475 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1973) (California's choice
to deal only in English in the provision of forms and ser-
vices has a reasonable basis).
'
31 See Brief for Petitioner at 18 (1996 WL 272394).
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hard time meeting the standard of review applied
by the court with those so called burdens.
Both sides make forceful arguments regarding
whose speech is at stake. Petitioners make the broad
assertion that Arizona has the right to choose the
language in which it will speak. 35 They cite CB.S.,
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,3 6 for the
proposition that "the purpose of the First Amend-
ment is to protect private expression and nothing in
the guarantee precludes the government from con-
trolling its own.expression or that of its agents."137 (em-
phasis added). Petitioners conclude that because
speech uttered by government employees during the
course of performing their official duties is, for all
intents and purposes, "property" of the government,
Article XXVIII cannot possibly infringe upon the
First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. Moreover,
under such reasoning, government employees would
not have the right to choose the language in which
to perform their official actions.13 Petitioners argu-
ment misses the point. In cases like Waters, where
the Court held that, unlike members of the public,
governemnt employees could be barred from using
offensive words, the government had an interest in
creating an effcient and user friendly environment
for its citizens. Unlike Waters, however, in the present
case the State has stipulated to the fact that Kelly's
use of a non-English language actually contributed
to the efficient operation and administration of the
State. 39 Based on this, the State will be hard pressed
to convince the Court that a legitimate reason ex-
ists for suppressing Kelly's right to continue to com-
municate in Spanish. The same holds true for Sena-
tor Gutierrez, the other respondent in the case. Not
only might the Court find that inefficiencies could
result by disallowing him to communicate to his
constituents in Spanish, but the opportunity would
present itself for the Court to latch on to Scott
Angstreich's point: that the infringement upon the
recipients' right to receive information is the most
obvious First Amendment violation.14
0
Respondents structure their argument regard-
13 3 Id.
14Id.
'3 lId. at 19.
136412 U.S. 94 (1973).
13 7 Id. at 20.
138 Id. at 21; see also, Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661
(1994).
139 SedBrief for Respondent at 34 (1996WL 426410).
'40 See supra, discussion pp. 25-26.
ing the questions presented as follows: a) Article
XXVIII acts as a prior restraint on speech content
because the government effectively promotes speech
which it deems to be more valuable (speech in En-
glish) while suppressing speech it deems less valu-
able (speech in any other language),' 4' and b) any
right the government might have in communicat-
ing in a given language needs to be balanced against
the First Amendment rights of its employees and
the recipients of the communication.
42
With respect to the first part of its argument,
respondents focus on the appropriate standard of
review that the Court should apply towards Article
XXVIII. Citing cases such as 44 Liquormart v. Rhode
Island,143 and Asian American Bus. Group v.
Pomona,'" respondents assert that the Court must
apply strict scrutiny to Article XXVIII. In support
of this, they state that Article XXVIII acts as a prior
restraint by virtue of the fact that it chills such things
as "government employee speech on all levels, in-
cluding speech that informs the public about the
political process, government wastefulness, and mis-
conduct by public officials," all of which lie at the
core of the First Amendment.14s In the alternative,
respondents ask that the "heightened balancing test
from United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union,146 be applied. This test was established by
the Court to evaluate non-content based ex-ante
restrictions on speech which merely deter, rather
than ban, public employees' speech. 47 Under this
standard, a court is charged with balancing both the
interests of the employee in communicating freely
and the interests of future employees and possible
recipients of present and future communications.
For reasons already discussed,14 Arizona will have a
hard time passing either one of these tests should
they be implemented.
Moving on to the second part of their argument,
respondents propose that both the government
employees and the recipients of their communica-
41 Id. at 23.
'
4 2 Id. at 22; see also, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270-271 (1964).
141116 S.Ct. 1495, 1514 (1996) (speech restrictions
cannot be treated as simply another means that the gov-
ernment may choose to achieve its ends).
'44716 F.Supp. 1328, 1330 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (because
language used is an expression of natural origin, culture,
and ethnicity, regulation of language is a regulation of
content).
141 See Brief for Respondent at 22.
14. 115 S.Ct. 1003,1013 (1995).
147 Id.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 129-134.
tion have First Amendment rights in the speech be-
ing communicated. 49 They cite Givhan v. 14estern
Line Consol. Sch. Dist.,s° and Johnson v. Multnomah
County,' in support of the proposition that gov-
ernment employees have speech interests in their
job-related communications. Although the employ-
ees' interest alone may not be sufficient to outweigh
the government's interest in such things as "effi-
ciency", "unity", and "the preservation of English",
coupling that with the impairment on the First
Amendment rights of recipients dearly tips the scales
against the government. On this latter point, respon-
dents point out that "the public's right to receive
communication involving ideas and information has
long been recognized to be a necessary corollary to
enumerated First Amendment freedoms, including
the right to assemble and petition for redress of griev-
ances."'5" Based on said effects on both employees
and recipients, respondents claim that Article
XXVIII should be struck down by virtue of its vio-
lation of the First Amendment to the Constitution.
Once again, it is important to note that the approach
which the Court may adopt inherently depends
upon whether it views the speech as the "property"
of the government, or that of the individuals pro-
viding and or receiving the communication. The fi-
nal section will attempt to predict the approach that
the Court will take, if any, based upon an analysis of
the questions asked by the Justices upon oral argu-
ment.
b. Oral arguments before the Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court heard oral
arguments for 95-974, Arizonans for Official English
v. Arizona on Wednesday, December 4, 1996. From
the start, it was evident that it was going to be a
long day for the petitioners (A.O.E.and Robert D.
Park)I" given that ChiefJustice Rehnquist immedi-
- ately made it clear that the Court was greatly inter-
'491d. at 25.
150439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979) (public employee does
not forfit his protection against governmental abridgment
of freedom of speech if he decides to express his views
privately rather than publicly).
I' 48 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1995) (government employ-
ees are afforded first amendment protections when they
speak about non-private issues during the scope of their
duties).
'Id. at 26; see also, Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 867 (1982).
' Mr. Park is the Chairman ofArizonans for Official
English. A.O.E. was a major proponent of the ballot ini-
tiative which led to the passage of Article XXVIII. The
ested in hearing arguments respecting the procedural
issues,1s and advised counsel 55 to spend the major-
ity of his time addressing these matters as opposed
to the questions on the merits.156 A few minutes into
counsel's opening statement, Justice Ginsberg in-
terrupted with a question regarding petitioners'
standing before the Court. She and Justice Briar
found it difficult to accept the 9th Circuit's reason-
ing in granting petitioners standing before that court,
based on the notion that their relationship to Ar-
ticle XXVIII was analagous to that of a state leg-
islature to a state statute. 5 7 Justice Ginsberg asked
counsel whether, under such rationale, and given
the fact that the measure in question was passed
by a ballot initiative, a citizen who had voted in
favor of the initiative would have standing be-
fore the Court to challenge the proceedings be-
low. Counsel was hesitant to answer this ques-
tion, and finally conceded that such would not
be the case. This interplay effectively resolved the
standing issue. When the Court decides the case
later in the term, it will-most likely hold that
petitioners did not have standing to be before the
Court. s8
Holding true to Chief Justice Rhenquist's ini-
tial statement, the rest of petitioner's time'59 was
devoted to answering the remaining procedural ques-
organization is said to have expended more than $300,000
and thousands of hours in volunteer time in the promo-
tion of the initiative. See Brief for Petitioner at 11 (1996
WL 272394).
s See 64 U.S.L.W, 3635. In addition to the questions
presented on the merits, the Supreme Court specifically
asked petitioner to address the following procedural ques-
tions: i) do petitioners have standing to maintain the ac-
tion, and ii) is there a case or controversy with respect to
respondent Yniguez?
"- Mr. Bamaby W. Zall of Williams & Jensen, P.C.
acted as Counsel of Record for petitioners.
'S6See 64 U.S.L.W 3635.The questions presented on
the merits are as follows: i) does a state constitutional
provision declaring English the official language of the
state and requiring English to be used to perform official
acts violate the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause?,
and ii) does a government employee have a free speech
right to disregard the official language in which to per-
form official actions? Id.
"7 See Brief for Respondent at 8 (1996WL 426410).
The 9th Circuit reasoned that like a state legislature, pe-
titioners had a strong interest in the vitality of a provision
of the state constitution which it had proposed and for
which it had vigorously campaigned. Id.
'The case was decided on March 3, 1997, four days
prior to the final revision of this article. See Arizonans for
Official English v. Arizona, 1997 WL 84990 (U.S.). With
tion: whether a case or controversy existed with re-
spect to the respondent?' 6 Justice Scalia took com-
mand of this line of questioning. Summarizing
the proceedings below, Justice Scalia wondered
aloud whether a case or controversy ever existed
for the proceedings before the ninth circuit.'
6'
Over and over, Justice Scalia asked how a case or
controversy could have existed, and can now ex-
ist, given that the adversarial party in the case
(Governor Mofford) refused to appeal the Fed-
eral District Court's decision.' s6 Justice Scalia
stated to counsel his belief that the case was over
then, and seemed unconvinced by counsel's at-
tempts to indicate otherwise. At this point in the
proceedings, it was evident that the case had been
resolved. When the decision is rendered, the
Court will most likely have vacated the proceed-
ings below on the ground of a lack of a viable
case or controversy.'16
D. A Brief Look at the Constitutionality of En-
glish-Only Provisions Under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution provides that "[n]o State shall... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
respect to standing, the Court followed the approach from
Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987) (leaving ques-
tion of standing unresolved, temporarily, in order to first
inquire as to whether a valid case or controversy still ex-
ists). See Arizonans, 1997 WL 84990, *13 (U.S.).
159 Counsel for petitioner did, however, reserve two
minutes upon which time he addressed the merits. Spe-
cifically, counsel made arguments regarding whose speech
is at stake (government versus individual) and overbreadth.
10 See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)
(to qualify as a case fit for federal- court adjudication,
actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review).
'6 See generally, Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official En-
glish, 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1991); Yniguez v. Arizonans
for Official English, 975 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1992); Yniguez
v. Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir.
1994); Yniguez i. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d
920 (9th Cir. 1995).
'61 See Yniguez v. Arizona, 730 F.Supp. 309 (D.Ariz.
1990).
'1 See Arizonans, 1997 WL 84990, *17 (U.S.) (ex-
ceptional circumstances present in case and the federal-
ism concern led Court to conclude that vacatur down the
line was the equitable solution). In cases brought before a
federal court, it is settled law that the court has the dis-
cretion to abstain and refer the matter to a respective state
tribunal. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496 (1941); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
tion of the laws."'" The argument can be made that,
in addition to the First Amendment infirmities, En-
glish-only provisions violate the Equal Protection
Clause. The Supreme Court has traditionally applied
three standards of review under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to statutory or administrative classifica-
tions in which similarly situated people are treated
differently. These standards of review are strict scru-
tiny, 6 intermediate scrutiny, '66 and rational basis.' '
In a recent law review article, 6 Daniel J.
Garfield suggests that, under the traditional inter-
pretation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
would most likely find English-only amendments
constitutional because they would not be deemed
to discriminate against a suspect class on their face,
and would not be found to abridge a recognized fun-
damental right.169 However, Garfield sets forth two
persuasive arguments for rendering such laws un-
constitutional. First, he states that, regardless of
whether or not there is a suspect class, English-only
provisions are not constitutional given the fact that
they do affect a fundamental right: the right to par-
ticipate equally in the political process. 170 Second,
he argues that English-only provisions may be un-
constitutional because they are simply using lan-
guage as a proxy for discriminating on the basis of
ethnicity 7'
Garfield's first argument is most persuasive.
Although the Supreme Court did not feel it neces-
sary to hear arguments regarding the constitution-
ality of Article XXVIII under the Equal Protection
Clause at the orals, the respondents fashioned an
argument similar to Garfield's in their brief to the
Court.7 2 Specifically, they claimed that Arizona's
116 S.Ct. 1712 (1996). The Arizona Supreme Court has
before it, in Ruiz v. State, the question: What does Article
XXVIII mean? The question remains whether this state
tribunal will provide a narrower interpretation of Article
XXVIII than that of the Federal District Court, thereby
enabling it to fall within the confines of the First Amend-
ment. See Yniguez v. Arizona, 730 F.Supp. 309 (D.Ariz.
1990).
'6 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, §1.
16s The Court will apply strict scrutiny when a stat-
ute discriminates against a suspect class, or infringes upon
a fundamental right implicit in the Equal Protection
Clause. Strict scrutiny review requires the state to show
that the classification furthers a compelling state interest
in the least restrictive way possible. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982).
'6 Intermediate scrutiny will be applied for quasi-
suspect classifications. In order to meet this standard, the
state must show that the law is substantially related to an
important governmental interest. See e.g., Craig v. Boren,
adoption ofArticle XXVIII severely limited the dis-
course between its citizens and their government
by virtue of the fact that it targeted a minority of
the Arizona population who lacked English language
skills and prohibited them from communicating with
their representatives and elected officials.' Had the
Court been willing to consider the merits of the case,
it very well could have found Article XXVIII's limi-
tation on its citizens incompatible with the notion
of a republican form of government.
III. CONCLUSION
To answer the question which was on the mind
of the woman in the department store, and the re-
spective lobby groups which are still pushing for the
passage of English-only provisions such as Article
XXVIII, I suggest that we need look no further than
the natural incentives which exist for the use and
evetual mastery of the English language. Query as
to how anyone can worry about the demise of this
language given that we live in an increasingly global
economic environment which relies heavily on the
English language, and provides ample rewards to
those who have developed their skills in the same.
In the domestic setting, English is and will continue
to be the foundation of our society given that our
'Western culture" revolves around all aspects of com-
munication, including, but not limited to, the
InterNet, Television, Radio, Newspapers, and other
forms of mass media.
I propose that the real question is not whether
anybody speaks English in this country anymore, but,
rather, whether anyone can afford not to pursue their
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
'6 This standard requires that the statute be ratio-
nally related to a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
160 See Daniel J. Garfield, Don't Box Me In: The Un-
constitutionality ofAmendment 2 and English.OnlyAmend-
ments, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 690 (1995).
'69 d. at 692-693.
"OId. at 739. The Court's explicit recognition of the
right to participate equally in the political process would,
at a minimum, ensure that minorities can attempt to af-
fect the outcome of a political process that substantially
affects their lives. Id.
17 Id. at 740. See also, Juan F. Perea, Demography
and Distrust: An Essay on Ameican Lamguages, Cultural
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269,281
(1992) (Stating that language is fundamentally an ethnic
trait).
'
7 2 See Brief for Respondent at 30-31 (1996 WL
426410).
13Id. at3L
knowledge of the English Language. Everybody
speaks English in this country' Although those who
have just immigrated will need some time to
develope their skills, they too will speak English.
Realizing the 'American dream" will be more than
enough incentive to do do.
English-only provisions, such as Arizona's Ar-
ticle XXVIII, are based on nothing more than un-
supported fears and nativist ideals. Such laws are
not necessary in a land such as our own, which is on
the long but steady path to achieving ethnic and
racial harmony. Not only are these provisions un-
necessary, but, more importantly, they are uncon-
stitutional. English-only provisions infringe upon the
free speech rights under the First Amendment, and,
arguably, upon equal protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment.
